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A Introduction 
The UK as a Member State of the EU is bound by two EU Regulations on private international law 
(PIL) - Brussels IIa1 and Maintenance2 – and by one international treaty – the Hague Maintenance 
Convention 20073 -  which are important for children.  It is a common understanding among 
members of the UK PIL Advisory Committee and relevant Government officials that after Brexit the 
UK will do what is necessary under public international law to remain a party to the Hague 
Maintenance Convention 2007 (Hague 2007) without any break in its operation.  As the UK was one 
of the Members of the Hague Conference on Private International Law at the time of its Twenty-First 
Session (November 2007) it has the right to sign and ratify the Convention with no possibility of any 
other State objecting, see Art 58(1) and (2) of the Maintenance Convention.  It could sign and ratify 
the Convention on the same day and it would then enter into force for the UK as a Contracting State, 
rather than the UK as a participating Member State of an Regional Economic Integration 
Organisation (REIO) that has approved the Convention (see Art 59(3) of the Convention), on the first 
day of the month following the expiration of three months after the deposit of its instrument of 
ratification (see Art 60(2)(a) of the Convention). In order for this to be done so that the Maintenance 
Convention remains in force for the UK without any break between it being in force as a member of 
an REIO and it being in force as a Contracting State, the UK will have to exercise its external 
competence while still bound by the Convention as a Member State of the EU when under EU law 
the EU still has exclusive external competence.4 
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2011/432/EU of 9 June 2011 on the approval, on behalf of the European Union, of the Hague Convention of 23 
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Franzina (ed) The External Dimension of EU Private International Law After Opinion 1/13 (Intersentia, 2017).  
This is best done by agreement with the EU. The text of the Hague Maintenance Convention 2007 is available 
at https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=131 accessed 6 April 2017. The 
Convention is in force in 35 States, see https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-
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The UK is bound in public international law by two Hague Conventions which are important for 
children – the Hague Child Abduction Convention 19805 (Hague 1980) and the Hague Child 
Protection Convention 1996 (Hague 1996).6 It is a common understanding among members of the 
UK PIL Advisory Committee and relevant Government officials that after Brexit the UK will remain a 
party to both of these Conventions as the UK ratified both of them as a Member of the Hague 
Conference.  They were not approved by the EU as an REIO and therefore Brexit has no direct 
bearing on their continued binding force in international law for the UK and other Contracting States 
to those Conventions.7  This clear cut statement even applies to States that have acceded to Hague 
1980 where the acceptance of their accession has been authorised by the EU since the Court of 
Justice of the European Union gave the highly controversial Opinion 1/13 saying that the acceptance 
of the accession of non-EU States to Hague 1980 falls within the exclusive external competence of 
the EU.8 The reason being that Hague 1980 does not recognise the possibility of an REIO making 
declarations under the Convention on the acceptance of the accession of States to that Convention.  
Instead, such declarations must be made by Contracting States to the Convention.9 Therefore, the 
Council makes Decisions authorising the Member States of the EU (apart from Denmark) to declare 
the acceptance of non-EU States and it does so unanimously.10 When an EU Member State makes 
such a declaration it follows the standard formula agreed by the Council: 
 
‘[Full name of EU MEMBER STATE] declares that it accepts the accession of … to the Hague 
Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, in 
accordance with Council Decision (EU) …’.11 
 
When the UK makes such a declaration and deposits it at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Netherlands,12 Hague 1980 takes effect between the UK and the acceding State concerned on the 
first day of the third calendar month after the deposit of the declaration of acceptance and Brexit 
will not affect the continued operation of such treaty relations because the UK makes such a 
declaration as a Contracting State to Hague 1980.13 Following Brexit, the UK will be able to make its 
own decisions on whether or not to declare its acceptance of States acceding to Hague 1980 and the 
UK Government should be diligent to do so whenever it is clear that the acceding State has 
                                                          
5 For the text of the Convention and its status see the Hague Conference Child Abduction section at 
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/specialised-sections/child-abduction accessed 6 April 
2017.   
6 The text of the Convention is available at https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-
text/?cid=70 and the status table showing there are 46 Contracting States is available at 
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=70 both accessed 6 April 2017. 
7 However, as pointed out by Nigel Lowe in his paper in this special issue of Child and Family Law Quarterly, 
Hague 1996 was given force of law in the UK through an SI adopted under s 2 of the European Communities 
Act 1972. Therefore, the method of keeping Hague 1996 applicable in UK law after Brexit is part of the detail of 
the Great Repeal Bill. 
8 Opinion 1/13 (Accession of third States to the Hague Convention), of 14 October 2014 EU:C:2014:2303. See 
generally Franzina above n 4 and in particular P Beaumont, ‘A critical analysis of the judicial activism of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union in Opinion 1/13’ 43.   
9 See Art 38(4) of Hague 1980. 
10 See K Vandekerckhove, ‘Consequences of Opinion 1/13 on the Acceptance in the EU of Accession to the 
Hague Child Abduction Convention’ in Franzina n 4 at 71. 
11 See eg Art 1(2) of  Council Decision (EU) 2015/1023 of 15 June 2015 authorising certain Member States to 
accept, in the interest of the European Union, the accession of Andorra to the 1980 Hague Convention on the 
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction [2015] OJ L163/29. 
12 As required by Art 38(4) of Hague 1980. 
13 The EU accepts that earlier declarations of acceptance made by some EU Member States, in relation to the 
acceding States for which the Council has authorised other EU Member States to accede, are still valid and 
binding in public international law, see eg Art 4 and recital 12 of Council Decision (EU) 2015/1023 n 11 above. 
implemented the Convention properly with an appropriately staffed and equipped Central 
Authority. The position prior to Opinion 1/13 will be restored. 
 
The UK Government in its White Paper on Brexit14 mentions the possibility of a transitional 
arrangement to avoid a “cliff-edge” when the UK leaves the EU and one element in such 
arrangements might be the way in which the UK and EU “cooperate” on “civil justice matters”. One 
purpose of this paper is to see if any future cooperation on civil justice matters concerning the 
private international law of children is needed on a bilateral basis between the UK and EU or 
whether the multilateral regime that both the UK and EU are bound by is appropriate. There is no 
“cliff-edge” here because the legal regime provided by the three Hague Conventions will apply to 
our relations with the EU Member States immediately that the EU Regulations cease to apply. 
 
B Brussels IIa Regulation compared to the Hague 1980 and 1996 Conventions 
 
The first comparison that needs to be made is between the way in which the Brussels IIa Regulation 
works for children and the way in which the Hague Conventions of 1980 and 1996 work. This 
comparison is divided up into three areas of law: child abduction, parental responsibility and access. 
 
i. Child Abduction 
 
The only significant difference between the regime for international child abduction applicable at 
present to intra-EU cases as a result of Brussels IIa and the Hague 1980 Convention system that 
already applies to cases between the UK and non-EU Contracting States to the Convention and will 
apply after Brexit – in the absence of any special deal – to cases between the UK and EU Member 
States is the override mechanism. This mechanism enables a court in an EU Member State where a 
child was habitually resident before the child’s abduction to another EU Member State to override 
the non-return order by that other State if it was based on Article 13 of the Hague 1980 Convention 
and for the override return order to be automatically enforceable with no grounds for refusal in all 
EU Member States. The author of this paper led a Nuffield Foundation-funded study into how the 
override system is operating in the EU.15 It reported in 2016 and the clear evidence from that study 
was of how ineffective the system is.  The authors recommended scrapping it. These were the 
reasons given in the conclusion: 
 
 The research project has indicated that there are problems with the Article 11(6)- 
(8) Brussels IIa procedure and that return orders given under Article 11(8) are 
rarely ever implemented, either through legal enforcement or otherwise. The procedure 
often gives false hope to left-behind parents, is only accessible to those who 
are made aware of the procedure by solicitors or other organizations, and in some 
countries legal aid is limited so even those aware of the procedure might not be 
able to utilize it. The procedure also increases animosity between the parents, prolongs 
the period of instability for the child, and can delay contact between the child 
and the left-behind parent. Consequently the overall conclusion is that the procedure 
should be removed from a revised Brussels IIa.16 
 
                                                          
14 The United Kingdom’s exit from and new partnership with the European Union (HM Government, 2017) 12.2. 
15 A paper giving a full analysis of the data and all the national reports from the EU Member States upon which 
the analysis was based are available on the Centre for Private International Law website at 
http://www.abdn.ac.uk/law/research/conflicts-of-eu-courts-on-child-abduction-417.php accessed 24 March 
2017. 
16 P Beaumont, L Walker and J Holliday, ‘Conflicts of EU courts on child abduction: the reality of Article 11(6)-
(8) Brussels IIa proceedings across the EU’ (2016) 12 Journal of Private International Law 211 at 258. 
Some of the statistics on which this conclusion was based are repeated here in order to understand 
the empirical basis for the conclusion. The study uncovered only 66 applications concerning 70 
children which involved Article 11(6)-(8) of Brussels IIa between its entry into force and June 2015.  
This was for the whole of the EU and is therefore a remarkably small number. The only countries 
where it has been used more than once a year are Italy (17 cases) and the UK (11 cases).17 Out of the 
66 cases the reason for the Hague non-return order was at least in part Article 13(1)(b) in 41 of 
them.18  Of the 66 cases, 28 resulted in a return order and the issuance of an Article 42 Brussels IIa 
certificate (which is designed to make the override decision one that is not reviewable in other EU 
courts), in 28 cases a return order was refused and in 10 cases the outcome is unknown.19 Of the 28 
return orders a full welfare analysis was definitely carried out in 5 cases before the return order was 
made.20 Furthermore, in 7 of the 28 cases where a return order was made was the child definitely 
returned to that country21 and in only 5 of those 7 cases was the return done legally rather than by a 
re-abduction.22 14 out of the 70 children were definitely heard in the Article 11(6)-(8) Brussels IIa 
proceedings and in only one of those cases was a return ordered.23 9 out of the 33 children who 
were 6 and over involved in this type of proceedings were heard directly or indirectly in those 
proceedings.24 In 28 of the 66 Article 11(6)-(8) Brussels IIa proceedings the abducting parent was not 
heard.25 
 
It is also worth noting that the view that the override system in Brussels IIa should be scrapped is not 
unique to commentators in the UK. Thalia Kruger and Liselot Samyn reached the same conclusion: 
 
The first problem is that it is not uncommon that a [Hague refusal to return a child order] is 
based on more than one ground. In these circumstances it is unclear whether the second 
chance procedure is available or not [as it expressly applies only where a refusal is based on 
Article 13 of the Hague Convention]. The second problem is that the second chance 
procedure takes up more time. Brussels II bis does not even provide a time limit in which this 
procedure must be completed. Third, the extra procedure potentially increases the conflict 
in the family. It increases the stress on the entire family and especially the child. Fourth, if 
we take children’s rights seriously, as we have advocated above, it is inconceivable to listen 
to the child only the second time he or she says something.  
Our proposal is to abolish the second chance procedure and return to the delicate balance 
struck by the Hague Child Abduction Convention. This will recover the same treatment of 
abducted children whether in or outside the EU. It will reiterate the approach of reverse 
subsidiarity.26 
 
                                                          
17 Ibid at 213-214. 
18 Ibid at 216. This relatively high figure for the grave risk of harm defence within the EU and other qualitative 
data from the study indicate that Art 11(4) of Brussels IIa is not being applied properly within the EU to reduce 
the number of non-return orders on Art 13(1)(b), see ibid at 218-9 and see also evidence from some EUPILLAR 
national reports that the extra requirements in intra-EU cases for child abduction, like Art 11(4) of Brussels IIa, 
are not always being referred to by national judges, see P Beaumont, M Danov, K Trimmings and B Yüksel, 
Cross-Border Litigation in Europe (Hart, 2017) esp Chapters 5 and 26. 
19 See Beaumont et al, above n 16 at 224-225. 
20 Ibid at 227. 
21 Ibid at 229. 
22 Ibid at 230. 
23 Ibid at 234-235. There were at least 3 other cases where the child was given the opportunity to be heard but 
it was prevented by the abducting parent or it was not clear if it transpired, ibid. 
24 Ibid at 241. 
25 Ibid at 242-246. 
26 Thalia Kruger and Liselot Samyn, “Brussels II bis: successes and suggested improvements” (2016) 12 Journal 
of Private International Law 132 at 159 (footnote omitted and words in brackets added by this author). 
The Commission in its Proposal for a Recast of Brussels IIa is suggesting some welcome 
improvements to the override system27 but keeping this extra layer of complexity in child abduction 
cases will still be less satisfactory than the Hague 1980 system.28 
 
Currently Hague 1996 has an advantage over Brussels IIa in relation to provisional measures which 
can be ordered by the court where the child has been abducted to in order to facilitate the return of 
the child to the country of his or her habitual residence. Such measures under Article 11 of the 1996 
Convention carry automatic recognition effects with them until the authorities in the State of 
habitual residence have taken the measures required by the situation. An order under the 
equivalent provision in Brussels IIa, Article 20, carries no such extra-territorial effects. It is not clear 
whether Article 11 of the 1996 Convention can be invoked in intra-EU cases at the moment but it 
should be possible.29 If the Recast of Brussels IIa follows the Commission’s Proposal, then this 
problem will be solved by moving Article 20 on provisional and protective measures to the new 
Article 12 within the core part of the jurisdiction chapter and thereby enabling the measures to be 
recognised and enforced in other EU Member States.30  
 
ii. Parental responsibility 
 
The rules in Hague 1996 and Brussels IIa are very similar.  This is no surprise as the latter was 
modelled on the former with a view to paving the way for Hague 1996 to be part of the EU acquis. 
The differences are subtle.  In relation to the transfer provision, the Hague 1996 version, Articles 8 
and 9, seems preferable to the Brussels IIa version, Article 15, because it is slightly more flexible and 
because Brussels IIa seems to have the undesirable consequence that whenever a child is habitually 
resident in an EU Member State, the case cannot be transferred to a non-EU Contracting State to the 
1996 Convention to have his or her parental responsibility issues determined even though this 
would be in the best interests of the child.31 The Commission’s Proposal for a Recast of Brussels IIa 
will make transfers from EU Member States to Hague 1996 Contracting States easier as has been 
described by Paul Beaumont, Lara Walker and Jayne Holliday as follows: 
 
In general terms the Regulation applies when the child is habitually resident in an EU 
Member State bound by Brussels IIa. It also applies to the recognition and enforcement of 
decisions between EU Member States bound by Brussels IIa, regardless of whether the child 
is habitually resident in a third State (Article 75(1)). However, there are some exceptions to 
these general rules. In cases where there is a choice of court agreement in favour of a court 
in a non-EU 1996 Hague Contracting State then Article 10 of the 1996 Convention applies 
(Article 75(2)(a)). Where the authority in a Member State wishes to transfer jurisdiction to a 
                                                          
27 See Commission’s Proposal for a Recast of Brussels IIa 30 June 2016 COM(2016) Final 411. The effects of this 
change are explained in P Beaumont, L Walker and J Holliday, ‘Parental Responsibility and International Child 
Abduction in the proposed recast of Brussels IIa Regulation and the effect of Brexit on future child abduction 
proceedings’ (2016) International Family Law 307 at 309-313, see also for a slightly updated version Working 
Paper No. 2016/6 ‘Parental Responsibility and International Child Abduction in the proposed recast of Brussels 
IIa Regulation and the effect of Brexit on future child abduction proceedings’ available at 
http://www.abdn.ac.uk/law/research/working-papers-455.php accessed on 24 March 2017. 
28 Art 7 of Hague 1996, in a similar way to Art 10 of Brussels IIa, preserves the jurisdiction of the courts of the 
habitual residence of the child before the abduction to decide on parental responsibility/access until the child 
becomes habitually resident in the country where he or she was abducted to and certain other conditions are 
met to ensure respect for Hague 1980 but wisely does not create an override system in relation to a Hague 
1980 non-return order.  
29 See Beaumont et al, n 16 above at 219-221. 
30 Commission’s Proposal, n 27 above. The effects of this change are explained in Beaumont, Walker and 
Holliday, (2016) IFL 307 at 313-314 and in Working Paper No. 2016/6 n 27 above. 
31 See Kruger and Simon, n 26 above at 154. 
third State, which is a Contracting State to the 1996 Convention, then Articles 8 and 9 of the 
1996 Convention apply (Article 75(2)(b)). This provision will be particularly useful after Brexit 
(the UK leaving the EU) because it clarifies that the 1996 Convention will apply to transfers 
of jurisdiction between the EU Member States and the UK after the UK leaves the EU 
(assuming that Brussels IIa will no longer apply to the UK and that the 1996 Convention will 
continue to apply in all EU States and in the UK).32 
 
Those authors went on to demonstrate why Hague 1996 provisions on transfer are preferable to 
Article 15 in Brussels IIa: 
 
In this respect the 1996 Convention is better than Brussels IIa. From a drafting point of view, 
it is better to have two separate Articles making it very clear that the non-competent courts 
can request a transfer to them as well as the competent court requesting a transfer to a 
non-competent court. Brussels IIa restricts the courts that can request a transfer to a 
defined list in Article 15(3) whereas the 1996 Convention allows more flexibility, see Articles 
8(2) and 9(1).  Under Brussels IIa a transfer can only be ordered with the approval of one of 
the parties as required by Article 15(2) but no such condition is imposed by the 1996 
Convention. The 1996 Convention seems preferable to Brussels IIa by allowing a transfer 
where the child is not a party to the case in the court competent to hear it and neither of the 
parents agrees to a transfer but that court wants to protect the best interests of the child by 
transferring the case to a court that is in a better position to assess the child’s best interests. 
This could occur where in the non-competent State someone would be appointed to 
represent the child’s interests or legal representation for the child would be properly funded 
there and the competent court believes that the parents are not acting in that child’s best 
interests. 
 
There is another important difference between the transfer provision in Article 15 of Brussels IIa and 
in Articles 8 and 9 of Hague 1996. In the former the drafters require that the court with jurisdiction 
may transfer the case to another court in the EU if it “is in the best interests of the child” (Article 
15(1)) and that if it decides to transfer the case, the other court must only accept it if it decides that 
it is in the best interests of the child to do so (Article 15(5)).  In contrast, under Hague 1996 it is only 
the court that is asked to accept the transfer that has to consider that this “is in the child’s best 
interests” (Article 8(4)).  The court considering giving up its jurisdiction is asked to consider whether 
the other court is better placed in the particular case to “assess the best interests of the child” 
(Article 8(1)) and before a court that does not have jurisdiction over the parental responsibility of 
the child can request the court having such jurisdiction to authorise them to exercise jurisdiction in a 
particular case it must consider that it is “better placed in the particular case to assess the child’s 
best interests” (Article 9(1)). 
 
Therefore it is clear that under Article 15 of Brussels IIa the requirement to be met for granting a 
transfer is to fulfil two independent tests: 
 
(a) which is the better placed court to deal with the parental responsibility case in issue; and 
(b) is it in the best interests of the child for the other court to hear the case in issue? 
 
In contrast, the standard under Hague 1996 for requesting a transfer (Article 9(1)) or offering a 
transfer (Article 8(1)) is a single test where the assessment of whether another court is “better 
                                                          
32 See Working Paper No.2016/06, n 27 above at ‘H’. 
placed” to hear the case in issue is done on the basis of whether the other court is better placed to 
“assess the child’s best interests”.33 
 
Therefore, the case law of the UK Supreme Court34 and the CJEU35 on Article 15 of Brussels IIa 
cannot be simply read across as being directly applicable to transfers under Hague 1996. Both of 
those courts interpret Article 15 of Brussels IIa as containing two separate tests: (1) is the other 
court “better placed” to decide the case in hand and (2) is the transfer of the case in the best 
interests of the child.  The CJEU has even downplayed the importance of assessing the best interests 
of the child in Article 15 of Brussels IIa by placing the main emphasis on determining on a non-
substantive law basis which court is better placed to decide the parental responsibility issue in hand: 
 
To that end, the court having jurisdiction must determine whether the transfer of the case 
to that other court is such as to provide genuine and specific added value, with respect to 
the decision to be taken in relation to the child, as compared with the possibility of the case 
remaining before that court. In that context, the court having jurisdiction may take into 
account, among other factors, the rules of procedure in the other Member State, such as 
those applicable to the taking of evidence required for dealing with the case. However, the 
court having jurisdiction should not take into consideration, within such an assessment, the 
substantive law of that other Member State which might be applicable by the court of that 
other Member State, if the case were transferred to it. 36  
 
The Court of Justice then deliberately does not require the transferring court to consider that it will 
positively be in the best interests of the child to transfer the case to another court but only that: 
 
the envisaged transfer of the case to a court of another Member State is not liable to be 
detrimental to the situation of the child concerned. To that end, the court having jurisdiction 
must assess any negative effects that such a transfer might have on the familial, social and 
emotional attachments of the child concerned in the case or on that child’s material 
situation.37  
 
It seems to be the case that under Hague 1996 the court considering offering a transfer or 
considering making a transfer request has to compare which of the possible courts to hear the case 
is best placed to hear it from the perspective of determining the child’s best interests. Therefore, no 
consideration should be given to substantive law (as the CJEU rightly stated in relation to Article 15 
Brussels IIa) but the examination of the relative merits of the two courts should focus on the ease 
with which those courts can determine the best interests of the child. Thus the most important 
factors seem to be the location of the child, the people contesting parental responsibility and any 
witnesses from whom oral testimony would be desirable.  Other relevant factors may be whether 
                                                          
33 Indeed this was the test applied by Baker J in a judgment of 14 October 2016 In the matter of the 1996 
Hague Convention and in the Matter of M and L (Children) [2016] EWHC 2535 (Fam) at [31].  He decided that 
the courts in Norway and England and Wales were in most respects equally well placed to assess the best 
interests of the two boys apart from the fact that the Norwegian court had not been asked and the mother 
was not seeking to ask it to hear the case in relation to both boys whereas he could ask the Norwegian court to 
surrender the case in relation to one boy so that he could hear the cases in relation to both boys together. 
Baker J, at [1], indicated that he thought this was the first reported judgment in England and Wales on the use 
of Arts 8 or 9 of Hague 1996. 
34 N (Children), Re [2016] UKSC 15. Decided on 13 April 2016, see K Trimmings 'Transfer of Jurisdiction and the 
Best Interests of the Child' (2016) 75 Cambridge Law Journal 471. Even though Baker J’s decision, ibid, was 
after the UK Supreme Court’s decision he did not refer to it in his judgment. 
35 Case C-428/15 Child and Family Agency v J.D. of 27 October 2016, EU:C:2016:458. 
36 Ibid at [57]. 
37 Ibid at [58]-[59]. 
the parties (and possibly the child depending on the circumstances) can be legally represented and, 
where appropriate, the availability and cost-effectiveness of experts (eg child psychologists and 
social workers) to assist in the determination of the child’s best interests. 
 
In the global context it is easier to admit the transfer mechanism in Articles 8 and 9 is a development 
from the Scottish doctrine of forum non conveniens38 than it is to say something similar in relation 
to Article 15 of Brussels IIa.  The brilliant French Professor who wrote the explanatory report on 
Hague 1996, Paul Lagarde, said: 
 
These Articles introduce into the Convention a reversible mechanism for forum non 
conveniens and forum conveniens, where it appears that the child’s best interest is that his 
or her protection be ensured by authorities other than those of the State of the habitual 
residence.39 
 
But perhaps Professor Lagarde should have said: 
 
These Articles introduce into the Convention a reversible mechanism for forum non 
conveniens and forum conveniens, where it appears that authorities other than those of the 
State of the habitual residence are better placed to determine what measures of protection 
are needed in the child’s best interests. 
 
Under Hague 1996 it is only when the court having jurisdiction authorises a possible transfer to 
another court that the other court must assess if “it considers that “it is “in the child’s best interests” 
for it to assume jurisdiction in the case in issue.  It will be aware that if it decides that it not in the 
best interests of the child for it to assume jurisdiction, the case in hand will have to be decided by 
the court that authorised the possible transfer of jurisdiction.40 Interestingly, if the court that does 
not have jurisdiction requests the case to be transferred to it under Article 9 of Hague 1996 there is 
no requirement on any court to assess that the requesting court is correct to assume jurisdiction in 
“the child’s best interests”.41 
 
Another example of the flexibility of Hague 1996 compared to Brussels IIa is that a transfer can be 
made to or requested by any court of a Contracting State “with which the child has a substantial 
connection” (see Article 8(2)(d)) whereas under Article 15(3) of Brussels IIa there is an exhaustive list 
of specific connecting factors. Once again the doyen of French private international law faithfully 
explains the origins of this flexibility in a global context as follows: 
 
                                                          
38 On the doctrine of forum non conveniens – Scotland’s greatest legal export - see P Beaumont and P 
McEleavy, Anton’s Private International Law (3rd edn, SULI, 2011) 359-367 and for its origins in the Scottish 
mixed legal system before spreading throughout the common law world see A Arzandeh, ‘The origins of the 
Scottish forum non conveniens doctrine’ (2017) 13 Journal of Private International Law 130. 
39 See the Lagarde Explanatory Report on Hague 1996 available at https://assets.hcch.net/upload/expl34.pdf 
(accessed on 6 April 2017) at para 52. 
40 See ibid at para 56: “If the requested authority does not reply within a reasonable period of time to the 
request which has been addressed to it, it will be, since the text does not speak to this situation, for the 
authority whose jurisdiction was initially invoked to draw the consequences and to exercise its jurisdiction 
fully.” 
41 Whereas under Art 15 of Brussels IIa the requesting court has to apply a test which seems to require it to 
assess whether the transfer of the case to it from the court having jurisdiction is “in the best interests of the 
child” but given the decision of the CJEU in Case C-428/15 n 35 above may only require them to consider that 
the transfer to it of the case would not be detrimental to the situation of the child, see text accompanying n 37 
above. 
Paragraph 2 mentions, finally, ‘a State with which the child has a substantial connection’. 
This formulation, the flexibility of which goes very well with the underlying theory of forum 
non conveniens which inspires Article 8, encompasses and exceeds the three preceding 
cases mentioned, which are only illustrations. It will permit, according to the case and 
always as a function of the child’s best interests, the possible jurisdiction, for example of the 
authorities of the State of the former habitual residence of the child, or of the State in which 
members of the child’s family live who are willing to look after him or her.42 
 
Post- Brexit the UK and the EU Member States when considering whether to transfer cases on 
parental responsibility between the UK and an EU Member State or vice versa will be able to more 
openly acknowledge the forum non conveniens roots of the transfer provision that will then apply 
(Articles 8 and 9 of Hague 1996) and take advantage, where appropriate, of the slightly greater 
flexibility that the Hague 1996 version provides as to a court with a substantial connection with the 
child and of its clearer focus on finding the correct forum to determine the child’s best interests in 
the dispute in hand. 
 
One area where Brussels IIa is clearly better than Hague 1996 is prorogation. Article 12 of Brussels 
IIa permits a wider set of options for choice of court than Article 10 of Hague 1996. The former 
permits prorogation of the divorce court in relation to parental responsibility matters even when 
neither party is habitually resident there. Furthermore, the former permits the parties to choose the 
courts of a country that is not hearing their divorce to deal with a parental responsibility measure 
where “the child has a substantial connection with that Member State” and certain other conditions 
are met.   
 
A quick legislative fix for this is not easy.  However, in practice many of the problems can be 
overcome by using the transfer system in Articles 8 and 9 of Hague 1996. Given that both parties 
want their chosen court to hear the case they can either go to that court and ask it to request a 
transfer of the case to it (using Article 9) from the court having jurisdiction under Hague 1996 or 
they can go to the court having jurisdiction under Hague 1996 and request it (using Article 8) to 
transfer the case to their chosen court.  As long as their chosen court has a “substantial connection” 
with the child then this will be possible and one imagines that most judges will grant a non-
contested transfer request.43 
 
For a legislative fix Article 52 of Hague 1996 does allow for departure from the rules of Hague 1996 
by way of an agreement between one or more Contracting States to the Convention or by “uniform 
laws based on special ties of a regional or other nature between the States concerned.”  The former 
would allow for a part of the Brexit agreement between the UK and the EU to continue the 
operation of Article 12 of Brussels IIa in relations between the UK and the EU Member States. The 
uniform law approach might be a useful way of widening the limited possibility of choice of court in 
parental responsibility cases provided for by Article 10 of Hague 1996.  This could have particular 
appeal in the Commonwealth where inter alia Australia is already a well-established Contracting 
State to Hague 1996.  Another way forward is to conclude a new Convention at The Hague that will 
permit parents of a child to agree a jurisdiction to endorse an agreement that they have already 
reached on some or all of the following: custody, access, maintenance and property issues. It may 
even be the case that such a Convention – or perhaps a sister Convention to it – could give the 
parents of a child the power to choose a jurisdiction to resolve some or all of the following issues 
together: divorce, financial provision on divorce, custody, access, maintenance and property issues.  
Both these Conventions may well place limits on which jurisdictions the parents can choose but still 
                                                          
42 Ibid at para 55. Only the former of Lagarde’s two examples is covered by the exhaustive list in Art 15(3) of 
Brussels IIa. 
43 Thanks to Lara Walker for pointing this out. 
create more flexibility than is provided at the moment by the combination of Brussels IIa and the 
Maintenance Regulation in the EU and by the combination of Hague 1980, 1996 and 2007.44 An 
obvious example of a limit on choice of court would be to disallow the choice of another court 
where both parents and the child are habitually resident in one country. 
 
The rules for recognition and enforcement of parental responsibility measures are very similar under 
Hague 1996 and Brussels IIa. However, Hague 1996 allows for a review of the jurisdiction of the 
authorities of the State where the child protection measure was taken by the enforcing authorities 
which is not permitted under Brussels IIa.  This permits, eg a review of where the child was 
habitually resident at the relevant time when that was the basis of jurisdiction used by the 
authorities granting the measure which is sought to be enforced.  This has the advantage that the 
enforcing authority can prevent the circulation of measures based on a clearly erroneous exercise of 
jurisdiction.  One feature which will help to restrict the review by the enforcing authority is that it “is 
bound by the findings of fact on which the authority of the State where the measure was taken 
based its jurisdiction.”45 However, it must be noted that although habitual residence is a factual 
concept – or perhaps better a mixed question of fact and law46 – the finding that a child is habitually 
resident in the jurisdiction is not a finding of fact for this purpose.47  
 
In relation to the other grounds for refusal of a parental responsibility measure there is a lot of 
symmetry between Brussels IIa and Hague 1996.48 It is comforting that the Commission is not 
proposing to widen the divergence in its Proposal for the Recast of Brussels IIa49 apart from 
removing what is now Article 23(b) (the mirror of Article 23(2)(b) of Hague 1996) and Article 23(g) 
(the mirror of Article 23(2)(f) of Hague 1996).50 The former protects the ability of the requested 
State to not recognise a parental responsibility measure if it is not satisfied that the child had been 
given a proper opportunity to be heard by the authority granting the measure. The Commission’s 
proposal for a revised Brussels IIa tries to ensure that the child will be given such an opportunity to 
                                                          
44 See the work of the Experts’ Group at The Hague on Family Agreements involving Children that the present 
author has the privilege of chairing at https://www.hcch.net/en/projects/legislative-projects/recognition-and-
enforcement-of-agreements accessed on 6 April 2017. It is worth noting that Brussels IIa partially helps with 
this problem compared to Hague 1996 in that Art 46 provides that “agreements between the parties [on 
parental responsibility and/or access] that are enforceable in the Member State in which they were concluded 
shall be recognised and declared enforceable under the same conditions as judgments.” The Commission 
Proposal for a Recast makes this Art 55 and changes “declared enforceable” to “enforced” and “judgments” to 
“decisions”. 
45 Art 25 of Hague 1996. 
46 See Centre for Private International Law Working Paper No. 2015/3- Recent Developments on the Meaning 
of "Habitual Residence" in Alleged Child Abduction Cases by Paul Beaumont and Jayne Holliday available at 
http://www.abdn.ac.uk/law/research/working-papers-455.php accessed 10 April 2017. 
47 This is discernible from the Lagarde Explanatory Report, n 39 above at para 131 on Art 25: “If, for example, 
the authority of origin decided as an authority of the State of the child’s habitual residence, the authority of 
the requested State will not be able to review the facts on which the authority of origin based its assessment 
of habitual residence.” (emphasis added) 
48 Compare Arts 23 and 26 of Brussels IIa with Arts 23 and 27 of Hague 1996. Both systems contain a public 
policy exception, an exception where the person claiming that the measure infringes his or her parental 
responsibility was not given an opportunity to be heard and an exception for a conflict with a later measure 
given in a third State that is recognisable in the requested State.  
49  It would abolish the exequatur (declaration of enforceability stage) in relation to parental responsibility 
measures in line with the current position in relation to child abduction override return orders and access 
orders, see recital 33.  However, as in Brussels Ia (see P Beaumont & L Walker ‘Recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters in the Brussels I Recast and some lessons from it and the recent 
Hague Conventions for the Hague Judgments Project’ (2015) 11 Journal of Private International Law 31 esp 33-
35) the grounds for refusal are moved to the actual enforcement stage rather than abolished. 
50 See Art 38(1) of the Commission Proposal n 27 above. 
be heard by the authorities exercising jurisdiction to take the parental responsibility measure51 and 
to have to certify that they have done so52 and then for the enforcing authorities to rely on mutual 
trust that it has actually happened. The Brussels IIa reforms to try to ensure that a child is heard by 
the authorities taking the decision on a parental responsibility measure are welcome. However, the 
Brussels IIa system of automatic enforcement of the override of a non-return order in child 
abduction cases was predicated on the idea of guaranteeing that the child should be given a proper 
opportunity to be heard in the country of the child’s habitual residence before the override order 
could be granted but the evidence shows that often such orders are being granted without a child 
being given a real opportunity to be heard.53 It seems that the Commission are being overly 
optimistic and risking the rights of the child by taking away the protection of the child’s right to be 
heard being reviewed by the enforcement authorities in other Member States. Such a review was 
upheld by the English and Welsh Court of Appeal in relation to a Romanian decision where the child 
was not given an adequate opportunity to be heard because it did violate a fundamental principle of 
English procedure.54 Briggs LJ said: 
 
Article 23 contains exceptions to the core principle of mutual recognition which lies at the 
heart of BIIR. It must therefore be narrowly construed. But I do regard the failure even to 
consider whether to give David an opportunity to be heard as fully deserving being 
described as a violation of a fundamental principle of the procedure of our courts. Although 
some might regard the age of seven as lying near the borderline above which the giving of 
such an opportunity might be regarded as routine, the very large implications for him of the 
decision sought by his father, namely a complete change in his main carer and a move to a 
country in which he had not lived since very soon after his birth, cried out for consideration 
of the question whether he should be heard, all the more so since the mother, who might 
have been supposed to be likely to put the case for preserving the status quo, appeared to 
be taking no part in the appeal.55  
 
 
It will be one benefit of Brexit if this opportunity to review whether the fundamental principle of the 
law of the relevant part of the UK on a child having an opportunity to be heard has been respected 
by the authorities in an EU Member State remains under Hague 1996 even if it is removed from 
Brussels IIa by the Recast.56 
 
 
                                                          
51 Ibid at Art 20 which says: “When exercising their jurisdiction under Section 2 of this Chapter, the authorities 
of the Member States shall ensure that a child who is capable of forming his or her own views is given the 
genuine and effective opportunity to express those views freely during the proceedings. The authority shall 
give due weight to the child's views in accordance with his or her age and maturity and document its 
considerations in the decision.” 
52 Ibid at Art 53(5) – certifying that the child was given a “genuine and effective” opportunity to express his or 
her views in accordance with Art 20. 
53 See text accompanying notes 23 and 24 above. 
54 See In re D (A Child) (Recognition of Foreign Order) (Reunite Child Abduction Centre intervening) 
 [2016] EWCA Civ 12; [2016] 1 WLR 2469.  
55 Ibid at [108].  See also Ryder LJ at [44] who said: “the rule of law in England and Wales includes the right of 
the child to participate in the process that is about him or her. That is the fundamental principle that is 
reflected in our legislation, our rules and practice directions and our jurisprudence. At its most basic level it 
involves asking at an early stage in family proceedings whether and how that child is going to be given the 
opportunity to be heard.” 
56 The UK has opted in to the negotiations on the Brussels IIa Recast but that does not give it a veto over any 
changes to the Recast even while the UK is still a member of the EU, see Art 3(2) of the Protocol on the 
Position of the UK and Ireland in respect of the area of freedom, security and justice [2008] OJ C115/295. 
iii. Access 
 
One of the realities of cross-border enforcement of access is that it is usually an attempt to enforce 
an order in the country where the child is now habitually resident. In those circumstances if the 
foreign access order is controversial, the courts in the place where the child is habitually resident will 
have jurisdiction to alter it rather than enforce it.57 This is highlighted by a European Court of Human 
Rights decision in Manic v Lithuania that will be examined shortly.58 One of the differences between 
Hague 1996 and Brussels IIa is that the latter creates a special temporary continuation of access 
jurisdiction for the courts of the former habitual residence for a three month period after the child 
has moved lawfully from one Member State to another and acquired a new habitual residence in the 
State it has moved to. This jurisdiction only applies for a three month period following the move, 
only for the purpose of modifying a judgment on access rights already issued in that Member State 
before the child moved, and where the holder of the access rights is still habitually resident in that 
Member State and has not accepted the jurisdiction of the courts of the Member State of the child’s 
new habitual residence by participating in proceedings before those courts without contesting the 
jurisdiction.59 The question is whether this very limited jurisdiction coupled with the automatic 
enforcement of access judgments under Article 41 of Brussels IIa adds any value to the Hague 1996 
system. 
 
In Manic v Lithuania, a Romanian/Moldovan man and a Lithuanian woman met in the UK in 2005.  
They had a son on 18 September 2007. In July 2008, while the mother was in Lithuania with the son, 
she told the father that their relationship was over and she was keeping the child in Lithuania. The 
father launched Hague 1980 return proceedings in Lithuania and the Vilnius Regional Court gave its 
decision on 6 March 2009. It accepted that the child was habitually resident in England and Wales in 
July 2008 and that the child’s father had custody rights under English law.  However, it refused to 
return the child, on the basis of Article 13(1)(b) Hague 1980, because the baby was dependent on 
being looked after by his mother and she could not look after the baby in London without financial 
support which the father was not promising to provide.60  
 
The father started new proceedings in the English and Welsh High Court seeking an order under 
Articles 11(6)-(8) of Brussels IIa to get the child returned to England.  Charles J gave a judgment on 
28 April 2010.61 It was based on a full welfare inquiry.62 The judge was disappointed that the English 
proceedings took 12 months and that this had been a factor in creating the “very considerable 
degree of antagonism” that had grown between the parents.63 The judge correctly noted that he 
could order interim contact between the child and the father in England without this being a return 
order and it appears that this was successfully done in March 2010.64 In his final order Charles J 
decided that the mother should be allowed to relocate permanently to Lithuania with the child and 
that there should not be a shared care arrangement involving the father and mother.65 Instead, the 
father is to have staying contact of 7 to 10 days four times a year with the child.66  Rather 
                                                          
57 See eg Re S (Brussels II (Revised): Enforcement of Contact Order) [2008] 2 FLR 1358. 
58 App no 46600/11 judgment of the Second Section of 13 January 2015. 
59 Art 9 of Brussels IIa. 
60 See the judgment of the Second Section of the ECtHR at paras 9-12. It is not clear from that judgment that 
the refusal to return the child by the Vilnius Regional Court was based on Art 13(1)(b) but this is clear from the 
judgment of Charles J in M v T (Abduction: Brussels II Revised, Art 11(7)) [2010] EWHC 1479 (Fam) at [9] and 
[41]-[43].  
61 See M v T (Abduction: Brussels II Revised, Art 11(7)) [2010] EWHC 1479 (Fam). 
62 Ibid at [14]. 
63 Ibid at [15]. 
64 Ibid at [22. 
65 Ibid at [84] and [100]. 
66 Ibid at the question and answer session recorded at the end of the judgment.  
surprisingly, Charles J did not just make an order for contact/access for the father that would be 
enforceable under Brussels IIa but insisted on an Article 11(8) “return order” just for the child to 
come back to England for 6 weeks to allow a more intensive period of contact with the father – 
provided he paid for the mother to come to England as well at a cost of £3000 – before he would 
allow the mother to relocate to Lithuania with the child permanently.67 The judge recognised that 
after the relocation to Lithuania the jurisdiction to decide on future access arrangements would pass 
to the Lithuanian courts.68 
 
On 18 June 2010 the England and Wales High Court issued a revised judgment and order which is 
referred to by the Second Section of the European Court of Human Rights but which is not reported 
in the UK.69  It required the mother to bring the child to the UK from 19 June until 14 July 2010 to 
allow contact between the father and son in England if he paid the mother £3000 to cover her costs 
and for two further contact visits in England from 18-25 September and 11-18 December 2010 
provided he paid £600 to cover the costs of the mother coming with the child for each of those 
visits. The June to July 2010 visit took place and therefore the mother was free to relocate 
permanently with the child to Lithuania. On 16 September 2010 the mother’s lawyer informed the 
father that she would not be making the contact visit with the child to England on 18 September and 
said that the jurisdiction over the child’s contact arrangements had now passed to the Lithuanian 
courts.70 The father then tried to enforce the English contact order in Lithuania requiring this contact 
visit in England by going through the English and Welsh Central Authority.  The response from the 
Lithuanian Central Authority was that such a contact order is directly enforceable in Lithuania and 
that it had been submitted to a bailiff for enforcement.71 Between 30 October 2010 and 10 February 
2011 the father wrote twenty six emails to the bailiff and produced the evidence that he had an 
Article 41 certificate under Brussels IIa from the English judge which gives him a directly enforceable 
right to have his contact rights enforced by the Lithuanian authorities.72 On 27 December 2010 the 
bailiff initiated court proceedings against the mother concerning the non-enforcement of the English 
contact order after the bailiff established that the mother had not gone to England with the child for 
the father to have contact between 11 and 18 December 2010.73 The Utena District Court dismissed 
the bailiff’s complaint on 27 April 2011 following its decision of 1 March 2011 to grant interim 
protective measures for the mother preventing contact outside Lithuania and requiring the father to 
have supervised contact with his son in Lithuania.74 The Utena District Court made a final contact 
order on 26 June 2012 which still allowed the father significant in person access in Lithuania even 
though it understood that there had been no in person contact between him and the child since 
June 2010 and telephone or other electronic communication.75  The father’s appeals against this 
order were out of time and his request to reopen the proceedings were dismissed by the Regional 
Court on 4 March 2014 and by the Supreme Court on 12 May 2014.76 
 
                                                          
67 Ibid at [96]-[101]. The judge did leave room to change the arrangements at the end of the 6-week contact 
period in England but there would need to be a “very significant change” of circumstances before he would 
not allow the mother to permanently relocate with the child to Lithuania at that point [101]. Charles J did not 
issue an Art 42 Brussels IIa certificate for the return of the child for the contact visit, see Beaumont et al, n 16 
above at 226, n 67. 
68 Ibid at the question and answer session recorded at the end of the judgment. 
69 App no 46600/11 judgment of the Second Section of 13 January 2015 at paras 21-23.  
70 Ibid at para 30.  She also repaid the £600 for that visit. 
71 See ibid at paras 31-33. 
72 Ibid at para 34.  
73 Ibid at 37. 
74 Ibid at paras 40 and 45-49. 
75 Ibid at paras 56-58. 
76 Ibid at paras 63-65. 
The Second Section of the European Court of Human Rights accepted that under Brussels IIa 
jurisdiction had passed to the Lithuanian courts to decide on contact issues three months after the 
mother moved permanently with the son from the UK to Lithuania in July 2010 and that therefore 
the Lithuanian courts had jurisdiction when the mother addressed her request to them in December 
2010.77 However the majority of the Court (five judges) went on to conclude that the way in which 
the State officials, the bailiff, the father’s court appointed lawyer and the Utena District Court had 
handled the decision-making in relation to altering the father’s contact arrangements was a violation 
of his Article 8 ECHR rights to family life because they took the decision without ensuring; in the case 
of the first two that the father’s position was put forward properly and in the case of the court that 
the father was heard. They awarded him 7000 Euros in non-pecuniary damages but did not even try 
to insist that the father be given contact with his son outside Lithuania.  
 
The minority of two judges said there was no violation of Article 8 ECHR because the father had not 
exhausted his domestic remedies due to the fact that he did not appeal on time in relation to three 
different Lithuanian orders. They also decided that there had been no violation of the State’s 
positive obligations to enforce the English contact order because it had been replaced by the interim 
contact order in Lithuania by 1 March 2011. Strangely, the minority did not really address the 
majority’s concern that Lithuania had failed to ensure that the father was heard by the Lithuanian 
courts before altering his contact arrangements instead noting that the father had not contacted his 
son in Lithuania despite having the right to do so under the interim and final Lithuanian orders.78  
 
This is a very sad saga but it does seem to illustrate the futility of making access orders automatically 
enforceable under Article 41 of Brussels IIa when they can be changed by the courts of the child’s 
new habitual residence 3 months after the child arrives there. In this case the ECtHR were not able 
to identify a failure to enforce the English order within that three month window (the child was 
already in Lithuania for 3 months by October 2010) or even in this case by the time of the Lithuanian 
court having changed the English order on an interim basis on 1 March 2011 to rule out contact 
outside of Lithuania.  The majority only found a violation of the ECHR on the basis of the way the 
State treated the father in the proceedings in Lithuania changing his contact arrangements. 
 
It seems that the Hague 1996 system with no special continuation of jurisdiction for the courts of the 
former habitual residence for access cases as provided for by Article 9 of Brussels IIa and no 
automatic enforcement of access rights as provided for by Article 41 of Brussels IIa is a more realistic 
system.79 No false hope is created because it is understood that the courts where the non-custodial 
parent lives cannot determine what will happen to contact arrangements for that parent once the 
child has been allowed to lawfully relocate to another State.  
 
Brussels IIa has different recognition and enforcement of judgments regimes for parental 
responsibility and access whereas Hague 1996 has the same regime for both. The Commission’s 
Proposal for the Recast of Brussels IIa plans to bring the two EU regimes a little closer together in a 
compromise between the two existing regimes.  So, at present in the EU, enforceable judgments 
given in one EU Member State in relation to rights of access which are certified in accordance with 
Article 41 of Brussels IIa are enforceable automatically in all other EU Member States (apart from 
Denmark) with no grounds for refusing enforcement. Under the Commission’s Proposal it will be 
possible at the enforcement stage to object to enforcement of an access order on the same basis as 
a child abduction override return order ie that is irreconcilable with certain later decisions on 
parental responsibility or: 
                                                          
77 Ibid at para 107. 
78 See dissenting opinion of Judges Spano and Kjolbro. 
79 For doubts about the automatic enforcement of access judgments under Brussels IIa see Kruger and Samyn, 
above n 26 at 160. 
 
where, by virtue of a change of circumstances since the decision was given, the enforcement 
would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the Member State of enforcement 
because one of the following grounds exists: 
(a) the child being of sufficient age and maturity now objects to such an extent that the 
enforcement would be manifestly incompatible with the best interests of the child; 
(b) other circumstances have changed to such an extent since the decision was given that its 
enforcement would now be manifestly incompatible with the best interests of the child.80 
 
In a post-Brexit era, even if the Commission’s Proposal above is adopted by the Council, it will in 
principle be harder to enforce access orders in other EU Member States because all of the Hague 
1996 grounds for non-recognition and enforcement come into play but conversely it will become 
easier in principle for judges in the UK not to enforce access orders.81 It has been noted by one 
English and Welsh judge interviewed under the EUPILLAR project that even when every effort is 
made to enforce foreign contact orders, because of an inevitable change of circumstances the judge 
“always” has to “change it in some way”.82 This reality is better reflected by the less rigid system of 
Hague 1996. 
 
 
C The EU Maintenance Regulation compared to the Hague Maintenance Convention 2007 
 
In accordance with the best application of the principle of reverse subsidiarity, the EU Maintenance 
Regulation 2009 was adopted after the Hague Maintenance Convention 2007 was concluded and 
built on, and affirmed two of the key pillars of the Convention: free legal aid for child support and an 
effective system of Central Authorities to assist people to obtain cross-border maintenance.83 The 
Convention and Regulation and their roles in cross-border recovery of maintenance have been 
extensively analysed in two major books.84 
 
Post-Brexit the legal systems in the UK (England and Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland) will be 
free to determine the rules of jurisdiction that apply to maintenance cases because Hague 2007 only 
creates indirect rules of jurisdiction. The one exception to this statement is that limitations must be 
placed on the ability of the maintenance debtor to seek to modify a decision given by the courts of 
the habitual residence of the creditor in any State other than the State where that decision was 
given, unless the conditions in Article 18 of Hague 2007 are satisfied.85 This condition will be satisfied 
if the jurisdiction rules in the EU Maintenance Regulation are retained as part of the Brexit Great 
Repeal Bill. The opportunity should be taken to abandon a strict lis pendens system vis-à-vis the EU 
Member States because, absent a special Brexit deal on the point, it will no longer be reciprocated 
                                                          
80 COM(2016) 411 final, Art 40. 
81 See the discussion on recognition and enforcement of parental responsibility measures above for an idea of 
the Hague 1996 system.  See in more depth The Practical Handbook on the Operation of the 1996 Child 
Protection Convention (HCCH, 2014) available at https://www.hcch.net/en/publications-and-
studies/details4/?pid=6096&dtid=3 accessed 10 April 2017. 
82 See M Danov, ‘Data analysis: Important issues to be considered in a cross-border context’ in Beaumont et al 
n 18 above in chapter 32 (n 64).  
83 See P Beaumont ‘International Family Law in Europe – The Maintenance Project, the Hague Conference and 
the EC: A Triumph of Reverse Subsidiarity’ (2009) 73 Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales 
Privatrecht 509. 
84 See P Beaumont, B Hess, L Walker and S Spancken (eds) Recovery of Maintenance in the EU and Worldwide 
(Hart, 2014); L Walker, Maintenance and Child Support in Private International Law (Hart, 2015); and the 
review of the two books by D McClean,  ‘Maintenance surveyed’ (2017) 13 Journal of Private International Law 
219. 
85 See Beaumont n 83 above. 
by the other EU Member States as, unlike Brussels Ia (see Articles 33 and 34), the Maintenance 
Regulation does not have any provisions permitting even the discretionary decline of jurisdiction in 
favour of a third State court that is first seised with the same or a related dispute.86 Repealing the lis 
pendens rules would mean that the common law discretionary system of forum non conveniens 
would revive. 
 
In relation to recognition and enforcement of maintenance decisions post-Brexit, it is clear that 
unless a deal is reached in the Brexit negotiations for a transitional or permanent bilateral 
agreement between the UK and EU on maintenance, the framework will be Hague 2007. This has 
some clear advantages for the UK over the continuation of the EU Maintenance Regulation regime. 
Under the latter, UK judgments are subject to an exequatur process in the rest of the EU that is 
similar to the one provided for by Brussels I before the Recast with some time limits added.87 
Therefore, there is no review of jurisdiction or of the merits but there is review on the basis of public 
policy, the rights of the defence being violated due to poor service or the right to a hearing not being 
respected, and conflicting judgments. The only difference after Brexit would be that the other EU 
Member States would apply Hague 2007 in relation to maintenance decisions from the UK. This 
would mean that a review of the jurisdiction exercised by the authorities in the UK would be 
undertaken to see if it complied with the indirect rules of jurisdiction in Article 20 of Hague 2007. 
Those indirect rules of jurisdiction are very generous to maintenance creditors because they include 
the habitual residence of the creditor and the EU has not made a reservation in relation to that key 
ground because it is a vital part of the jurisdiction regime in the Maintenance Regulation.  It is also 
true to point out that there are two more grounds for refusal of recognition and enforcement of a 
UK maintenance decision that could be invoked under Hague 2007 than can be invoked under the 
EU Maintenance Regulation. The first of these is that the decision was obtained by fraud in 
connection with a matter of procedure but this is not a change of substance as such a fraud could be 
handled under public policy under the EU Maintenance Regulation (as it can in other contexts under 
Brussels Ia).88 The second of these is that the decision was made in violation of Article 18 of Hague 
2007 but this should never happen in the UK because our rules of jurisdiction and the careful 
application of them by the judges in the UK should prevent the UK from breaching its international 
law obligations under Article 18. Thus, the weaker party will still be able to sue for maintenance in 
her own habitual residence in the UK and get the maintenance decision enforced in EU Member 
States without difficulty. 
 
In relation to maintenance decisions coming from EU Member States to the UK, the UK currently has 
to comply with the Maintenance Regulation which has abolished the exequatur for all maintenance 
decisions coming from those States (apart from Denmark). It is a radical style of abolition of 
exequatur where even at the actual enforcement stage the only ground for refusing to enforce a 
maintenance decision is that it conflicts with another maintenance decision.89  The reason for the 
unequal treatment of UK and Danish decisions compared to decisions from other EU Member States 
is that in the EU only the former States are not party to the Hague Maintenance Protocol of 2007 
that harmonises the applicable law rules in relation to maintenance issues.90 Thus, after Brexit the 
                                                          
86 Ibid at 541. 
87 See Walker, n 84 above at 98-104. 
88 Ibid at 157-160 and Beaumont & Walker n 49 above at 54-56. 
89 See Art 21 of Regulation 4/2009, n 2 above. The only other ground is that the prescription and limitation 
periods for enforcement of a judgment have expired under both the law of the State of origin and the law of 
the requested State. 
90 The Hague Maintenance Protocol is in force for 28 States, the EU 26, Kazakhstan and Serbia, see 
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=133 accessed 11 April 2017.  The UK 
chose to opt in to the EU Maintenance Regulation at the end of the negotiations conscious of the unequal 
treatment of its judgments compared to those of the other Member States because it was keen to show that 
UK will no doubt continue not to be a party to the Hague Maintenance Protocol because as a matter 
of policy it does not wish to apply foreign law to child and spousal support issues, and because at 
least in relation to the former of those issues it does not think the extra costs of applying foreign law 
are justified when dealing with relatively low value claims. The UK would apply the Hague 
Convention of 2007 to the question of whether or not to recognise and enforce a maintenance 
decision from an EU Member State. Thus, the UK courts could review whether the authority in the 
requesting State had jurisdiction compatible with the indirect rules of jurisdiction in Article 20, and 
will be able to refuse recognition and enforcement not only when it is incompatible with a 
conflicting judgment but also where it is manifestly incompatible with public policy, where the 
decision was obtained by fraud in connection with a matter of procedure, where proceedings 
between the same parties and having the same purpose were instituted in the UK first, where the 
defendant did not have adequate notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard and 
where the decision was made in violation of Article 18 of the Convention. These additional 
safeguards may rarely be needed but there are exceptional cases where the complete abolition of 
grounds of refusal can result in unfairness to the maintenance debtor.91 It is possible in many 
Member States of the EU for a maintenance decision to be granted against adult children on the 
ground that they are not maintaining their elderly parents. Some protection against this happening 
can be found in Article 6 of the Hague Maintenance Protocol but some judgments may not be 
contested in that State or may slip through the Protocol protection. In such circumstances it will 
often be appropriate on grounds of public policy, in relation to children that are strongly connected 
with the UK, not to enforce a judgment requiring them to maintain their elderly parents in another 
EU Member State. The restoration of a public policy exception is a wise thing that should be 
reinstated in the EU and having it reinstated through the application of Hague 2007 to post-Brexit 
recognition and enforcement of EU judgments in the UK is to be welcomed. 
 
D The Role of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
 
One factor in favour of keeping an involvement in the EU civil judicial cooperation on family law 
matters can be said to be the uniform interpretation that can be enhanced by the role of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). However, this is not a strong factor if the CJEU is not well 
equipped to play this role in relation to private international law of family law.  It is clear that very 
few if any of the Judges and Advocates General in the EU have any background in judicial or legal 
practice, or the academic analysis, of either private international law or family law.92 The recent 
EUPILLAR study, funded by the EU Commission, has shown that in a significant percentage of CJEU 
cases the judgments in private international law (and particularly in family law aspects) have met 
with significant disapproval from some academics and EU officials.93 The study has advocated that a 
specialist chamber should be created in the CJEU to deal with preliminary rulings on private 
(international) law issues with specialist Judges and at least one Advocate General and supporting 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the UK could be a good member of the EU even when it has an opt out system. The UK secured the right not to 
apply the Hague Maintenance Protocol by those issues being left out of the body of the Maintenance 
Regulation and instead being dealt with by the EU approving the Protocol for all its Member States apart from 
Denmark and the UK. For a brief analysis see Beaumont, n 83 above at n 66. 
91 For an analysis of when some controls can be useful in relation to recognition and enforcement of 
maintenance decisions see Walker, n 84 above at 105-120.  See eg the Polish case where the alleged father 
was required to pay maintenance even though he said he was not the father and was willing to undergo a DNA 
test to prove it but the Polish court gave its decision without ordering such a paternity test.  Under the old 
Brussels I system applicable at the time the German courts were able to refuse to recognise and enforce the 
maintenance decision on the basis that it was contrary to public policy, ibid at 123-124. 
92 Notable exceptions include the current President of the CJEU, Koen Lenaerts who does have an academic 
background in private international law, Judge Toader and Advocate General Szpunar. 
93 See Beaumont et al n 18 above in chapters 1, 3, 32, 33, 35, 37, 41 and 47. 
Legal Secretaries who have specialist expertise in practice and/or academia in these fields.94  
However, the study also reveals that any such change would only be made unanimously by the 
Member States of the EU and it would have to be done against the will of many if not all of the 
current members of the CJEU who seem very proud of its status as a generalist court on all aspects 
of EU law. 95 It makes little sense to advocate remaining under the jurisdiction of the CJEU for private 
international law of family matters not only for the political reason that removing the binding 
authority of all CJEU decisions in the UK is a red line issue in the Brexit negotiations96 but also 
because, objectively, it is not an appropriately qualified court to take final decisions on such sensitive 
matters. In this regard, the UK Supreme Court has much stronger legal credentials in terms of the 
relevant experience of its judges.97 Another relevant factor is that the CJEU’s overriding objective of 
helping to establish an ever closer Union can cloud its ability to act as a leading Court in the 
interpretation of international treaties to which the EU is a party or its Member States are parties. 
This can be seen in the Court’s case law on the relationship between Brussels I and certain specialist 
international treaties and in some of its case law under Brussels IIa where the relationship with 
Hague 1980 and Hague 1996 is not full assessed by reading foreign case law on the interpretation of 
those Conventions and trying to promote the uniform interpretation globally of those Conventions.98 
 
E Conclusion 
 
There is nothing to fear in the UK from Brexit in relation to private international law applicable to 
children. There is a clear exit strategy of falling back on the Hague Conventions of 1980, 1996 and 
2007 for the regime applicable to the UK’s relations with EU Member States. The only parts of 
Brussels IIa and the Maintenance Regulation that could usefully be kept in the Great Repeal Bill are 
the jurisdiction provisions. The legislature will have to consider what jurisdiction rules to apply in 
relation to cases that do not fall within the scope of Hague 1996. The best combination seems to be 
Articles 5-7 and 11-12 of Hague 1996 and Articles 12 and 14 of Brussels IIa with references to 
Member State and Contracting State being replaced by the UK or the relevant part of the UK. The 
common law forum non conveniens should apply to declining jurisdiction in favour of non-
Contracting States to Hague 1996. It would have to be made clear that the prorogation rule would 
give way to the Hague 1996 jurisdiction provisions in cases where the parties have chosen a court or 
the child is habitually resident in another Hague 1996 Contracting State. In the long run, efforts 
should be made to improve the choice of court regime for parental responsibility and access under 
the 1996 Convention by supporting the work of the Experts’ Group in the Hague Conference on 
Private International Law that is trying to widen party autonomy for family agreements involving 
children considerably beyond what is possible under Hague 1980, 1996 and 2007 and even beyond 
what is possible under Brussels IIa and the Maintenance Regulation (and the EU enhanced 
                                                          
94 Ibid at chapters 35 and 47. 
95 Ibid at chapter 3. 
96 See n 14 above at 2.3. 
97 Notably Lady Hale (academic and judicial background in family law) and Lord Wilson (legal practice and 
judicial background in family law) but also many of the other Supreme Court Justices either had family law 
and/or private international law experience in practice or as a judge in a lower court and certainly had 
extensive experience of private law matters. Though the UK would be well advised post-Brexit to ensure that 
all qualified lawyers have studied private international law (only Scottish advocates have this requirement at 
present) and this could be a very outward looking and sensible replacement for requiring a pass in EU law. 
98 See Beaumont et al n 18 above in chapters 3, 33, 41 and 47.  See also Working Paper No. 2016/6 n 27 above 
at ‘K’ saying: “the UK Supreme Court will be able to give a lead in uniform interpretation of the Conventions 
unfettered by the dynamics of the EU integration agenda which may distort the CJEU’s ability to carefully 
interpret international conventions consistent with the intentions of the drafters. The CJEU does not have a 
practice of referring to the leading jurisprudence of the courts of Contracting States when interpreting 
international conventions which makes it difficult for that Court to reflect an internationalist interpretation of 
those conventions.“ 
cooperation instruments on matrimonial property) by creating a one stop shop for all issues to be 
dealt with together in one forum (ideally divorce, financial consequences of divorce, maintenance, 
matrimonial property, parental responsibility, access and property issues relating to the children). 
 
The Hague Convention regime has certain advantages for the UK over the EU Regulation regime. In 
particular, it means that the unsuccessful experiment in overriding foreign Hague 1980 non-return 
orders can be abandoned and will not be applied in relation to child abduction cases between the UK 
and EU Member States in either direction. This means that the UK’s crucial role in helping to lead the 
world in the best interpretation and practice of the Hague 1980 Convention can be revitalised 
uncluttered by EU integration agendas and overblown conceptions of mutual trust that simply do 
not work. In relation to Hague 1996 the UK is well positioned to become the leader in best practice 
and interpretation of that Convention because it will have much more extensive case law under that 
Convention once all the cases with the EU Member States fall under it rather than Brussels IIa. That 
Convention is on the cusp of becoming truly successful and its greater visibility in the UK will give a 
much greater incentive for the UK to push for ratification and accessions to that Convention by the 
US, Commonwealth countries and other non-EU States. This in turn will create benefits for the EU in 
its promotion of the operation of Hague 1996 with the rest of the world. In relation to the substance 
of Hague 1996 compared to Brussels IIa, it has a more flexible and realistic regime in relation to 
access both for jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement. Finally, in the context of maintenance 
the UK will benefit from being free of the almost completely unqualified duty to recognise and 
enforce maintenance decisions from other EU Member States which is not reciprocated in other EU 
Member States (which nonetheless will apply the Hague Maintenance Protocol in cases involving 
one or more parties from the UK because the provisions of that Protocol have universal application 
and therefore UK citizens will still get the benefit of the special rules in Articles 5 and 6).  In addition, 
the UK can choose to abandon the strict lis pendens rules in the Maintenance Regulation and restore 
a more flexible system based on the Scottish doctrine of forum non conveniens. 
 
In all these matters students, practitioners and judges will be grateful to have fewer operative legal 
regimes post-Brexit than exist currently where we have a Hague international regime, an EU regime 
and in some cases residuary regimes operative in the UK. This can be reduced to an international 
regime and in some cases residuary regimes operative in the UK (which can be differentiated in the 
different legal systems in the UK to respect subsidiarity). 
